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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LAKE CREEK IRRIGATION CO., 
a corporation, 
Appellant 
vs. 
DON CLYDE and KATE CLYDE, 
his wife; LARRY F. CLYDE and 
BARBARA CLYDE, his wife; 
LOUIS A. KIRK and JANE KIRK, 
his wife; JAMES F. CLYDE and 
EARLENE CLYDE, his wife; 
ROBERT CLYDE and LYNETTE 
CLYDE, his wife, 
Respondents 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Case No. 
11148 
Pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure, appellanl 
herewith replies to new matters raised in responden~1 : 
brief. 
POINT I. 
APPELLANT'S ACTION TO A VOID THE 
EFFECTS OF EXHIBITS 7 AND 8 WAS 
NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMI-
TATION: 
Point IV of respondents' brief states that bec&usi 
appellant's action was not commenced for more than four 
years, the same is barred. In reply, we cite 45 Am. Jur. 
470 under section 89: 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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"Neither the language nor the policy of the 
registry acts was intended to affect the holders of 
antecedent rights, but only such persons as are 
compelled to search the records in order to pro-
tect their own interests. Accordingly, the univer-
sal rule is that the record of an instrument is con-
structive notice to subsequent purchasers and 
incmnbrancers only, and does not affect prior 
parties. The owner of real estate, it is said, is 
w1der no obligation to watch the records to see 
whether someone who does not own his property 
has assumed to place a mortgage upon it or con-
vey it by deed to some third person." (emphasis 
added) 
The above principles were clearly applied and the 
doctrines were enunciated in the United States Supreme 
Court case of ARMSTRONG v. ASHLEY, 204 US 272, 
51 L.Ed. 482, 27 S.Ct. 270; and in MC CONNELL v. 
DIXON, \¥yo., 233 P2 877. Also see annotation in 137 
ALR 290. Also see RYAN v. PLOTH, 140 P2 968 
(Wash.); KRAUSE v. MARINE TRUST & SAVINGS 
BANK, Calif., 1928, 270 P. 246. 
POINT II. 
APPELLANT RAISED QUESTION OF TWO-
THIRDS OF STOCKHOLDERS PRIOR TO 
APPEAL. 
A. A MUTUAL IRRIGRATION COMPANY IS A 
NON-PROFIT CORPORATION. At the bottom of page 
14 of respondents' brief they undertake the argument 
that appellant is a corporation "for pecuniary profit." 
There is not a scintilla of evidence thereof. All of the 
evidence points to the fact that appellant is a non-profit, 
mutual irrigation corporation and subject to the laws 
incident thereto. 
2 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The principal evidences thereof are the articles ol 
incorporation, first as filed in 1888 under the 1884 laws 
of Utah (exhibit 1), and the articles as filed in 194i 
(Exhibit 2) together with the Minute book (Exhibit 6). 
There is no other evidence in the record than these 
three sources, and they are more than adequate to settle 
the question in terms of a long line of decisions by tht 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
The respondents' brief at page 15 argues that "The 
Articles are in t1ie format of articles of a private cor. 
poration for pecuniary profit. .. " 'l'his is a clear decep-
tion. By ref erring to the Laws of 1884 cited by appellant 
the only statute under which corporations could then be 
formed was Chapter XL V "Of Private Corporations," 
under Section 1 thereof: "Hereafter, whenever any num-
ber of persons . . . desirous of associating . . . together 
for establishing and conducting any mining, manufat 
turing, commercial ... or the construction of ... irrigaf. 
ing ditches ... benevolent, charitable or scientific associ-
ation ... may, by complying ·with the provisions of thi1 
act, become a body corporate." (Laws of Utah 1884, page 
78) 
In Section 22 of said act, special provision is made 
for corporations named in Section 1 of the act which are 
not concerned with pecuniary profit, but such "may in· 
corporate themselves as provided in this act." It does 
not say "shall." There are no mandatory provisions thal 
distinguish profit from non-profit corporations excepi 
in Section 25 where it is made mandatory that a mortgag< 
or sale of the non-profit corporation property be accoDI· 
1 
3 
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plislwd "by a two-thirds' majority vote of its members ... " 
(emphasis added) 
An examination of the original Articles (Exhibit 1), 
ohows that the purpose for which appellant was formed 
was "'110 manage, control, regulate and equitably divide 
and <fo;tribute among the stockholders of the corporation 
acC'ording to their respective accrued rights the waters 
of Lak<> Creek ... for irrigating and domestic purposes." 
(Art. llI) 
In Article IV, after naming the subscribers: "The 
capital stock of said corporation consists of the rights to 
the w·w of water of Lake Creek ... for domestic and irri-
gating purposes, and the amount that each party owns 
in said creek estimated in acres is indicated in the fore-
going by the number of shares subscribed, each share 
representing one acre of water-right. . ." (Emphasis 
added) 
In the Articles as adopted in 1943 (Exhibit 2), re-
instating the corporation for lapse of charter, the pur-
poses are not altered except to more completely spell 
out the manner in which the full use and management 
of the waters of Lake Creek would be accomplished, one 
of these being the aspect of storage of water. The cor-
poration was authorized to do all incidental things to 
accomplish the "irrigation or enjoyment of the lands or 
property of its stockholders ... " (Article IV, 4). There 
is no business contemplated except those incident to the 
use of the water. Primary and secondary rights of the 
stockholder-users are carefully spelled out. 
Again in Article VIII "the capital stock of this cor-
poration consists of the right to the use of the waters 
4 
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of Lake Creek ... " which does not sound like a mercan. 
tile corporation engaged in buying, selling ordinary com. 
modi ties for profit! 
In Article IX "The officers and directors of this 
corporation shall perform the duties of their office sim~ 
lar to those perf armed by officers and directors of irr~ 
gation corporations similar to this corporation." (Em. 
phasis added) 
In Article XV "The Board of directors shall have 
power to mak~' by-laws for the management of said com-
pany, the regulation of its officers, the control of its 
property for the benefit of its stockholders," provided 
"that such by-laws and rules are approved by a majority 
of its stockholders ... " These provisions clearly make the 
directors trustees for the benefit of the water-users, and 
is clearly consonant with the doctrines of this court as 
laid down in the several opinions in SMITHFIELD 
WEST BENCH IRR. CO. v. UNION CENTRAL LIFE 
... 1943, 142 P2 866, 105 U. 468, where in the Larson 
opinion it is stated: 
"The waters of a mutual irrigation company 
belong to the users, the company being merely a · 
distributing and apportioning trustee .... The · 
water controlled by it may be used by any share· · 
holders, subject only to the regulation thereof by 
the company for the benefit of the shareholden 
so none shall be deprived of his rights by the 
others. The company cannot sell any of the water I 
without the consent of the stockholders . ... Like- i 
wise the company cannot permit the water to be 1 
lost by non-use thereof as long as any shareholder 
desires to and is in a position to use the water. 
Water undistributed may be used by any stock-
5 
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holder in a position to use it. The shareholders 
are in effect owners in common of the waters 
with certain limitations as between one another 
governing the use thereof. Each may therefor use 
any water not being used by any other sharehold-
Pr, as is the case ·with other owners in common ... " 
BAIRD v. UPPER CANAL IRR. CO., 257 P. 
1060, 70 u. 57 
FOWLER v. PROVO BENCH CANAL, 101 P2 
375, 99 U. 2G7, 1940 
BIG COTTONWOOD TANNER DITCH v. KAY, 
157 P2 795, ____ U. ____ 1945 
In GENOLA TOvVN v. SANTAQUIN CITY, 80 P2 
930, 96 U. 88, this court said: 
"Stock in a mutual company entails the right 
to demand such stockholder's aliquot share of the 
water in proportion as his stock holding bears to 
all the stock. Water rights are pooled in a mu-
tual company for convenience of operation and 
more efficient distribution and perhaps for more 
convenient transfer. But the stock certificate is 
not like the stock certificate in a company oper-
ated for profit. It is really a certificate showing 
an imdividPd part ownership in a certain water 
.rnpply. It embraces the right to all for such un-
divided part according to the method of distribu-
tion." (Emphasis added) 
GREEN DITCH WATER CO. v. MONSON, 116 
P2 387, 100 U. 466, 1941 
BURTENSHAW v. BOUNTIFUL IRR., 90 U. 
196, 61 P.2d 312, 1936 
Re: JOHNSON ESTATE, 64 U. 114, 228 P. 748, 
1924 
In GREEN DITCH v. MONSON, supra, this court 
said in a case determining that a mutual irrigation com-
pany was not subject to franchise tax: 
6 
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. "If. its :evenue was confined to money re. 
ce1ved from its stockholders in proportion to their 
interest, it could have no profits and it would con. 
duct no business from which the state sought t-0 
exact a license tax .... From their very nature, 
mutual irrigation companies differ from other pri. 
vate corporations, and yet they cannot well orga. 
nize as an eleemosynary entity. It is evident that 
the legislature in 1909 sought to exempt from the 
license tax such canal and irrigation companies 
as confined their activities to providing water for 
their owr memberships, regardless of the general 
language used in the articles." 
In coming to the above conclusion, the court was 
impressed with the allegation that the sole source of 
revenue to the mutual corporation "has been born by 
assessments duly levied against its members ... that 
said corporation has been throughout its existence, a 
non-profit corporation, and that said corporation was not 
organized for pecuniary profit. .. " 
In terms of the above, let us examine Exhibit 6, 
the minute book of appellant, dating back to 1934 to the 
present, as the best evidence of record of just how the 
company carried on its business. 
All income for the company was acquired by assess· 
ments, either of money or its equivalent in labor. 
The following pages in Exhibit 6, the minute book, 
are evidence of this: 1, 4, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, 15, 20, 21, 23, 27, 
29, 31, 33, 37, 40, 44, 47, 49, 52, 55, 58, 59, 61, 71, 78, 81, 
86, 90, 92, 95, 99, 101, 113, 120 and 123. 
In the last entry in Exhibit 6, the minutes record: 
"President Clyde Ritchie reported of the directors' meet 
ing held Sat., January 21, 1967, stating that a $1,000.00 
7 
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note would come due in July. In this meeting the direc-
tors decided that some of them might pay part of their 
full assessment, to pay the note off without borrowing 
more money." ( P. 123) 
The reading of the entire minutes defies any oper-
ations of the appellant except as a mutual, non-profit 
eorporation. 
The 1884 law under which appellant was organized, 
and whieh is quoted on page 15 of respondents' brief, 
required "a two-thirds majority vote of its members ... " 
to sell or mortgage the property. Section 16-6-9 now 
requires the same two-thirds vote. 
Even the preamble to the Agreement (Exhibit 7), 
prepared by attorney Hatch declared appellant to be "a 
mutual irrigation corporation." 
B. THE TWO-THIRDS VOTE WAS RAISED 
DURING THE TRIAL: 
On page 14 of respondent's brief in the middle para-
graph, the respondent falsely states that the issue of 
the consent of two-thirds of the stockholders was neces-
sary to bind a mutual irrigation company, was first 
raised in the appellant's brief. 
On page 8 of appellant's brief reference is made 
to "J R 30" meaning the Judgment Roll. Please advert 
thereto to number 1 of the Motion to Amend Findings, etc. 
which states: "1. To insert a finding of fact which will 
read "That Plaintiff is a non-profit corporation and a 
mutual irrigation company." The corrollary of this is 
found on page 31 of the JR in number 10 as follows: 
"Insert a Conclusion of Law to read "That the directors 
of the plaintiff do not have authority to convey the assets 
8 
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of the corporation but snch authority must be granted 
by a two-thirds vote of the stockholders at a meeting 
called for such a purpose>." After argument before tht 
court, the contentions of appellant were erroneously over-
ruled. (J. R. 40) Clearly the matter was well before the 
trial court. 
POINT III. 
EYIDI1~NCE \V A8 RECEIVED AS TO WHO 
\VERE THE S1'0CKHOLDERS AND THAT 
TWO l~XPRESS Ml~ETINGS \VERE HELD 
CONCERNING THE WRONGFUL ACTS OF 
THE PRESIDENT. 
On page 14 of respondents' brief in the middle para-
graph thereof, it is stated "No evidence was offered as 
to who the stockholders were or whether or not they ever 
held a meeting concerning the transfer." 
Respondents mislead the court. On page 18 of the 
transcript, the president identified Exhibit 6 as the min-
ute book. On page 122 the minute book was received in 
evidence. On page 106 of Exhibit 6 near the bottom 
the first reference is made to the subject of the litiga-
tion; and after said annual meeting of the stockholders, 
the Board of Directors had an important meeting con· 
cerning fishing rights at which it was learned that the 
president had denied to Russell Wall that he had ever 
executed a deed! 
On page 121 of the minute book, Exhibit 6, the 
names of stockholders owning 413 shares are set forth, 
together with the results of a vote taken at a special 
meeting of the company stockholders for the express 
purpose of acting on the recommendation of the board 
9 
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of directors to "set aside that certain Quit Claim Deed 
dated :March 1, 1959 and that certain agreement dated 
March 1, 1959 giving to the Clydes the fishing rights in 
Witts Lake and Deer Valley and other items." 
POINT IV. 
'L'Ill~ 'l'HIAL COUHT ERRED IN DECLAR-
IN(; THAT EXHIBITS 7 AND 8 WERE AND 
ARI!: VALIDLY EXECU'l'ED: 
In point III respondents have treated numerous sub-
jects. We deem it necessary to challenge and reply to 
certain of them, but only on the theory, which we deny, 
that the board of directors of a mutual irrigation com-
pany could convey assets without consent of the stock-
holders. 
On page 12 of their brief, respondents admit that 
the directors did not know the terms of the alleged agree-
ment. "Their professed ignorance of the acts of its presi-
dent and secretary in signing an agreement does not 
relieve the corporation from liability ... " And again: 
" ... their asserted collective failure to inquire ... " In 
E'inding number 7, reproduced at page 6 of respondents' 
brief, the court erred in finding that directors Holmes 
and Anderson "personally participated in performance 
under the agreement and had knowledge that an agree-
ment of settlement of many matters" had been reached, 
etc. We argue that in law there was no ratification. 
A. RATIFICATION: On page 13 of respondents' 
brief ratification by the board is claimed. Neither the 
facts nor the law warrant such a conclusion. 
By the respondents' citation at 19 Am. Jur. 2, 660 
it is mandatory that the corporation "repudiate the trans-
10 
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action" after "it has learned of an unauthorized act." 
Two things are implicit in the cited authority. l) the 
corporation must know specifically of the unauthorized 
act; and 2) it must act to repudiate at once. In this case 
the board of directors did not know of the unauthorized 
act; and when the directors learned thereof, they were 
disturbed. (Tr. 48) They acted at once to repudiate the 
president's act. 
IN McCONNELL v. DIXON, Wyo., 233 P2 877, it 
is stated: "A party alleging, asserting, or relying on a 
ratific2tion of the unauthorized act of an agent has the 
burden of proving it." It is respondents who have the 
burden and they have not sustained it to any degree. 
In this connection, let it be remembered that in sustaining 
such burden, the Wyoming case held that it must he 
proven "that the principal intended to ratify," and "to 
constitute ratification" the principal "must have full 
knowledge at the time of ratification of all material facts 1 
I 
and circumstances relating to the unauthorized act or i 
transaction. Note further what the Wyoming court said 1
1
. 
under "Ratification": 
"The principal, where nothing has occurred 
to put him on guard, is not bound to distrust his 
agent; he has the right to assume that the agent 
will not exceed his authority; - and he is not 
obliged before accepting the benefits of an un· 
authorized act, to inquire whether, in performi~g 
it the agent has not in some way violated !us 
t:Ust. Mere careless ignorance or mere negligence 
in not discovering the departure from authority, 
where there is nothing to suggest it, is not enough. 
Neither is the principal to be charged with mere 
11 
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c.onstructive notice. He is not, for example, ob-
hged to search the public records for evidence of 
his agent's fault and he is not charged because 
such records would disclose that the agent was 
performing unauthorized acts." Furthermore, 
acquiescence without knowledge of the material 
facts is not sufficient . ... The principal must have 
fidl knowledge of the imauthorized act of his agent 
and an opportunity to repudiate the same before 
any delay in repudiating the act in question can 
constitute a ratification thereof." 
Defendants-respondents have predicated most of their 
defense of the decision of the lower court on the existence 
of "an agreement" between the parties that would dis-
pose of all of the controversy. Counsel for the Clyde 
interests totally ignores the first and more important 
agreement between the parties and by a practiced obfus-
cation has undertaken to concentrate all attention on 
the second so-called agreement, exhibit 7, thus creating 
the strongest type of ambiguity as to ratification. 
It is imperative that the first "agreement" be ad-
verted to; it appears only in the minutes of the plaintiff 
corporation on page 74 thereof. (Ex. 6) At no time 
was the existence of said agreement ever disputed. Don 
Clyde testified there was such an original verbal agree-
ment. (Tr. 198) One of the defendants, Bob Clyde, was 
present at a board of directors meeting of appellant in 
1956 and the "right-of-way discussed .... Bob Clyde 
stated if a fence would be built on one side of the ditch, 
and a water trough put in and a bridge across the 
cement ditch, this would be all they would ask for a 
right-of-way through their ground." At no time do the 
respondents ever make any denial in this case of that 
12 
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understanding and agreement. 'l1hey try to cast all 
attention to an attempted formalization of that earlier 
agreement three years later, exhibit 7, wluch is thP 
one never known of or approved by the board of direc 
tors, but of which the unfair, misleading and deceptiv~ 
language is employed in the brief of respondents to show 
some form of ratification as follows: 
" ... at lt•ast fonr of the five directors never-
theless personally participated in performance of 
obligations under the agreement with knowledge 
that settlement of many matters of controversy 
with the defendants had been made. They, lik~­
wise, knew of the existence of an agreement o) 
some sort and that they were performing under 
an agreement." 
The above quoted language from page 11 of respond-
ents' brief creates a mis-impression. The court must find 
which agreement the said directors participated in per-
forming. Counsel refers us to the pages of the transcript 
for the answer, and it is clear that three of the four 
directors had no knowledge of exhibit 7. They all had 
full knowledge of the one appearing at page 7 4 of their 
minute book, exhibit 6. As we examine their testimony, 
be it remembered there were five directors constituting ' 
the board. Director Bond was never in Glen Hatch's • 
office concerning this business and exhibit 7 never came 
to his attention. (Tr. 211) The other director was the 
president, Clyde Ritchie. While he testified he did no! 
read what he signed on exhibit 7, he alone can be charged 
with knowledge of what it contained. (Tr. 49) Now 
note what the other three had to say about the two agree· 
ments: 
13 
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HARVEY CROOK, a director, objected on page 74 
to the "broad territory" taken in by asking questions 
about an agreement. He testified he did not "ascertain 
the exact terms of that agreement." (Tr. 74) He refused 
to state said agreement was after lambs had been lost. 
(74) 
Crook knew there was some dispute about the loss 
of lambs but the work that was done was not exclusively 
done in settlement of such dispute. (Tr. 75) He stated 
that "There was work done every season up there to some 
extent." (Tr. 75) After Crook knew there was a prob-
lem of the loss of lambs (which would be in 1959) he 
testified that he did no more work on fencing; after that 
he moved away, ceased to be a director. (Tr. 76, 77) Di-
rector Crook did not ever know that his corporation had 
paid Glen Hatch for the legal work as claimed in the 
brief. (Tr. 78) In this connection, let it be remembered 
Glen Hatch had served as counsel for the irrigation com-
pany for "several years" and the board was in the habit 
of paying Glen Hatch. (Tr. 18, 19) The president was 
irritated that Glen Hatch now represented the Clydes. 
(Tr. 134) 
On re-direct, Crook clarified, stating he was aware 
of an agreement "as to certain places on the reservoir 
that might be washing and that should be taken care of 
in this matter .... I was not aware of any written agree-
ment." (Tr. 80) Maintenance work was constantly going 
on by the directors and there was "no difference" between 
such maintenance and the work connected with the so-
called agreement. (Tr. 81) 
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That is the summation of the Harvey Crook testi. 
mony . By no stretch of logic or language could this or 
the lower court enter a finding that such agreement being 
testified to was anything but the one recorded in th1 
minutes at page 74. 
GEORGE HOLMES: This director also did wor! 
on the fencing, but "We were putting the fence up for 
the right-of-way for the ditch." (Tr. 103) Notice how 
careful he is on page 103-104 of the use of the wora 
"agreement." The fence work he was doing was "to pa~ 
for the right-of-way." (Tr. 104) Further, may the court 
be conscious of how careful the witness is to relate hi> 
work to fencing, spillway repair, but it is counsel for 
the Clydes that twists the inferences beyond the intent 
of the witness, as shown on page 105. At this time, when 
he is testifying to work accomplished there was no "dis· 
pute about fishing in this period." (Tr. 105) The extent 
of the talk was to get the date of opening changed. (Tr. 
106) This language by George Holmes cannot be twiste<l 
into knowledge or ratification of exhibit 7 or the dee~. 
KENNETH ANDERSON: This director, along wit~ 
the two just ref erred to, had never seen the agreement, 
exhibit 7, until just prior to bringing the law suit (Tr. 
110, 69, 71, 98) and there had been no discussion by tb 
board of said agreement. (Tr. 111) There had been di~ 
cussions concerning fencing, repairs. The ditch wll! 
cemented in 1956 and 1957. (Tr. 111) He and his boyi 
had fished for ten years. (Tr. 112) 
While he was aware there were problems of sheei 1 
being drowned, he stated he was aware that some "under
1 
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standing had been reached with the Clydes and Lake 
Creek . . . concerning those matters which included the 
fencing of the ditch," but "I didn't know of any agree-
ment." (Tr. 113) While Anderson acknowledged there 
had been a compromise with the Clydes, the exact terms 
thereof as argued in the brief were not ever in his mind. 
(Tr. 116) He participated in the fencing, and knew there 
were difficulties with the Clydes, but now see the revela-
tory answer on cross examination by Bullock of this 
director: 
"As I recall, the fence was approved and was 
done. When we talked with Bob (Clyde) he agreed 
if we built the fence, he would give us an e,asement 
for a right-of-way for the cement ditch. 
Q. That is why you were building a fence? 
A. That is right." (Tr. 117) 
Bullock trapped Anderson into false statement at 
the top of page 118 which was later clarified on re-direct: 
"I want to know if you were aware of any agreement 
in 1959 to do anything? A. No." (Tr. 118) It is clear 
the verbal agreement he was testifying to was with Bob 
Clyde and occurred as early as 1956, and is shown at 
page 74 of the minute book, exhibit 6. (Tr. 119) Appel-
lant's counsel asked Anderson what agreement concerned 
the work that was being done and the witness shows at 
page 119 and 120 of the transcript that it was pursuant 
to the minute at page 74, not to exhibit 7. It was so 
clear the witness knew of no agreement in 1959 that the 
court sustained an objection by Bullock on repetition, 
and there the testimony of the director Anderson closed. 
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Now as to these three directors, none of whom eve 
saw or heard of exhibit 7 or 8 until just before the sui: 
their testimony of agreement clearly concerns the on 
shown at page 78 of their minute book. "Some sort" u 
agreement, as stated on page ll of respondents' bri: 
must never be tortured into exhibit 7, but is clearly r: 
ferring to page 74 of the minute book and the day-to-da 
operations of the irrigation system. 
In connection with language appearing at page;. 
of the minute book "It was stated that a contract\. 
drawn up and to be signed by the land owners." Exhih 
7 was probably drawn in answer to said minute, but. 
was done three years later; and by that time, seven 
new ingredients had been grafted into the concept~ 
settlement as conceived by the Clydes and their attorne: 
There can be no doubt but that later several additiont 
elements than appeared on page 74 of the minutes wer 
in the minds of the Clydes and their attorney, and po' 
sibly these entered the mind of the president of the irr 
gation company, but such elements never came to tl 
attention of directors Cook, Holmes, Anderson nor Boni 
As we have argued, there can be no ratification in tl 
absence of full knowledge of the terms and conditiot 
being ratified. 
None of these directors had a hint that property1 
the mutual company was being conveyed. Cert.am 
these directors were doing maintenance work every yea: 
some of which would naturally come up in discussio1 
with their neighbors, the Clydes relative to washing 1 
the spill-way, fences and water ways that had been I 
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fore discussed. It is likely that these three directors 
believed their president had had minor understandings 
concerning the day-to-day operations of the reservoir 
and the cement ditch, but this is a far cry from an 
agreement to convey and deliver water down the Mills 
ditch, and to give up the company rights to fishing! 
rrhese were rights that vested in the members, the water 
users, and were not subject to conveyance as in a mer-
cantile corporation. 
Even the preamble to exhibit 7, the alleged agree-
ment, prepared by defendants' attorney, recites that 
Lake CreBk Irrigation Company is "a mutual irrigation 
corporation of the State of Utah." The attempted usur-
pation of power by the president to bind the water users 
' ~ 
is in language in two places in exhibit 7 that require the 
ie: 
diversion of storage water down the Mills Ditch. Para-
llll 
graph 3 contains this requirement so as "to water their 
1er 
po: stock (meaning the Clydes) in the area through which 
l!r the Mills Ditch passes." Then again in paragraph (5), 
tl the mutual company covenants with the Clydes "to draw 
sufficient water from the Deer Valley Reservoir to reach 
Oil' 
tl the Mills Reservoir and to conduct the same by ditch to 
the Mills Reservoir during the high water period in the iot 
spring and in the autumn. Note Don Clyde admitting 
the appellant company at no time ever honored that 
:y 
1 
language in exhibit 7 and had refused to turn waters into 
Ui 
the Mills Ditch. (Tr. 196, 187) 
r~ 
The reason for the two-thirds vote being required of 
;io1 
non-profit corporations in the Utah statute is here in 
1gi 
clear view. Neither the president, nor the directors of a 
1 I 
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mutual irrigation company would have the right to con-
vey the waters of the stockholders without the latter's 
vote. There must be preserved the sanctity of water 
rights in the water user, as distinguished from the right 
of a board of directors to do the common, day-to-day 
maintenance 01Jerations to keep the system operating. 
It would make good law to permit the board to control 
ordinary mainten[lnce and to make agreements concern-
ing same; but it is another story, and the invasion of 
vested rights to permit the conveyance of water into the 
Mills ditch and reservoir, or to deed away the rights of 
1 
fishing and fish culture, absent the knowledge and vote 
of the shareholders. The naked act of the president and 
the secretary who was not even a member of the board, 
could not accomplish what even the directors would have 
no authority to accomplish in a mutual irrigation com-
pany. 
B. REPUDIATION ACCOMPLISHED AT ONCE. 
It is clear from the minute book, exhibit 6, that onee 
the mutual company learned of the contract and deed, 
the board acted quickly to test the same, asking for and 
receiving a vote of the entire stockholders to repudiate 
the same. 
Let it be remembered that the sole maker of the deed 
denied he had executed the same when confronted by 
stockholder Wall just before this action was filed. (Ex-
hibit 6 page 107, Tr. 124) The minutes of a directors' 
meeting held January 18, 1965 show that "Russell Wall 
reported to the board on the assignment he had been 
given in July, 1964 to secure a private pond fishing per- l 
19 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
mit for the Witt Reservoir. He reported he had made 
application to the ... Fish & Game Commission for a 
private pond fishing permit in Jnly and that ... " in 
this connection the Fish and Game office had reported 
that "Boh Cl~-de had been to their office and indicated 
that the Clydes had a deed to this property for the fish-
ing rights. Mr. Wall assured Mr. Ware that this was 
not the case; that he, Mr. vVall, had been authorized by 
the board of directors . . . to secure the permit, and 
the Irrigation Co. was the owner of the land and fishing 
rights .... Mr. Wall also stated that ... he went to 
President Ritchie and President Ritchie said there was 
no such deed to his knowledge. Then Mr. Wall reported 
that he went to the court house to check this and found 
a quit claim deed to Don Clyde for the title to this prop-
erty. Mr. vVall presented a photo copy of the deed to 
the board and the board indicated that the legality of the 
deed should be checked since there had been no resolution 
given for this transaction in the minutes of the company. 
The meeting was recessed and the Annual Stockholders 
meeting was held ... " (Exhibit 6, page 107, 108) 
The minutes of the stockholders meeting held on the 
same day state: "The fishing rights were discussed. 
Authorization was given to the board to preserve the 
fishing rights for the company. (Exhibit 6, page 106) 
The following page references to minute book relate to 
the board's actions re. fishing rights. 109, 110, 111, 113, 
114, 119. In several of said minutes it appears the board 
negotiated with the Clydes; but as no compromise could 
be reached 344 shares voted at a special stockholders' 
' 
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meeting (Ex. 6, p. 121) instructing the board to bring 
court action to set aside the contract and the deed. Only 
69 shares voted against. 
Let it be well remembered that prior to the time the 
board of directors knew of the alleged agreement and 
deed, it had authorized Russell vVall to purchase 2000 
fish and plant them in Witt Reservoir, and he did so, 
purchasing the fish from private sources. (Tr. 128) Also 
about .July 10, 1964 the Witt Lake area was posted to 
private fishing showing that the company acted at that 
early date as though no deed had been executed. (Ex. 9, 
Tr. 126) In this connection, Wall was in the act of 
applying for a private pond permit when he first learned 
of the alleged deed to the Clydes. (Tr. 128, 129; Exhibit 
6, page 107) Numerous of the shareholders fished on the 
Witt. (Tr. 125, 88) Director Anderson fished "two years 
ago" which would be in 1964 or 1965. (Tr. 112) Had they 
known of the deed or agreement it is not likely they would 
have so fished. 
Also it should be born in mind that the company 
never put water into the Mills Ditch as per the alleged 
agreement. Don Clyde testified to this at page 187 and 
196 of the transcript. 
In these above matters, the mutual irrigation com-
pany had acted as though there was no agreement, and 
when informed, repudiated it quickly. 
Thus, in terms of the authority cited in the Ameri-
can Jurisprudence quote on page 13 of respondents' 
brief, the mutual company repudiated the unauthorized 
act of its president "within a reasonable time of receiv-
ing information of the unauthorized transaction." 
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C. APPARENT AUTHORITY: The citation on 
page 12 of respondents' brief of 19 Am. Jur. 2d 591 and 
the case following are not in point. The appellant cor-
poration at no time held Clyde Ritchie, its president, out 
to the public or to the respondents as having authority 
to bind the irrigation company. This is clear from exhibit 
12 where attorney Glen Hatch requested specifically the 
resolution of the board of directors concerning the sign-
ing of exhibits 7 and 8. Glen Hatch as attorney earlier 
for the appellant, and now for the respondents, clearly 
knew the limitations of the president. 
The American Jurisprudence citations in respond-
ents' brief are entirely beside the point. No authority 
can be inferred in President Ritchie; and in law, the 
execution of the agreement and deed were never known 
to the directors until just before the litigation to contest 
the same was filed. Nothing in the record suggests the 
corporation or the board of directors had permitted the 
president to "exercise the whole power of the corpora-
tion." Every bit of evidence points to the board making 
the decisions. (Tr. 48, 78, 80, 97, 108) The minute book 
is full of proof to this effect. The only time the presi-
dent was known to act arbitrarily and without consul-
tation with the board is the one being litigated. The 
following page references to the minute book, exhibit 6, 
will show how the board functioned historically. 74, 77, 
84,85, 86, 87, 89, 90,92,95, 98, 99, 100,101, 102, 104, 105, 
106, to the end. 
The cited case of HANOVER NATIONAL BANK v. 
AMERICAN DRY DOCK on page 12 of respondents' 
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